Abstract. In the course of making electronic services and facilities more widely accessible and usable, more and more IT systems are incorporating smart cards as a component. We analyzes the side channel attacks for the smart card and similar security evaluation criteria for smart card protection profiles based on the common criterion. Futhermore, we proposes the smart card security evaluation criteria for side channel attacks about vulnerability assessment activities in Security Assurance Requirements. It can be useful to evaluate a cryptosystem related with information security technology and in addition, it can be applied to building smart card protection profiles.
Introduction
A smartcard, based on the idea of embedding an integrated circuit chip within a ubiquitous plastic card, can execute cryptographic operations and provide high reliability and security. Much attention has been paid to the security issues of cryptosystems implemented in tamper-proof devices [1] . Recently, however, this had been a target of the side channel attacks. This paper 1 analyzes the side channel attacks for smart card devices, and proposes the smart card security evaluation criteria for side channel attacks about vulnerability assessment activities in Security Assurance Requirements. We considers if the side channel attacks are not a covert channel. Accordingly, we would separate part of side channel analysis from AVA CCA and AVA VLA under a discussion on CC public reviewed documents [2] [3] [4] . It will be discussed in detail in section 4. Our proposals can be useful to evaluate a cryptosystem related with information security technology and in addition, it can be applied to building smart card protection profiles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews Common Criteria and Protection Profiles, while section 3, We experiments on power analysis attacks. Section 4 introduces the propose of smart card security evaluation criteria for side channel attacks. Conclusion is presented in section 5.
Preliminaries

Common Criteria & Protection Profile overview
The Common Criteria (CC) [5] is the set of internationally and nationally recognized technical standards and configurations that allow for security evaluations of Information Technology IT products and technology. The CC prescribe a variety of assurance activities, such as design analysis, vulnerability analysis, penetration testing, and examination of development environment.
The evaluation of the IC in the CC Part 3 comprises Security Target, Development, Tests, Guidance, Configuration Management, Life-cycle support, Delivery and operation, and Vulnerability assessment. Protection Profiles provide a detailed level of security requirements and standards pertinent to a specific technology or security risk area based on the overall CC framework or specific to the evaluated IT product or technology. The increase in the number and complexity of applications in the smart card market is reflected in the increase of the level of data security required.
Vulnerability assessment (Class AVA)
The assurance class AVA defines requirements directed at the identification of exploitable vulnerabilities. Specifically, the class addresses the existence of exploitable covert channels, the possibility of misuse or incorrect configuration of the TOE.
1. Covert channel analysis (AVA CCA) This is directed towards the discovery and analysis of unintended communications channels that can be exploited to violate the intended TSP.
Misuse (AVA MSU)
The objective is to determine whether misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance, whether secure procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed, and whether use of the guidance will facilitate detection of insecure TOE states.
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA SOF)
The objective is to determine whether Strength of Function (SOF) claims are made in the ST and whether the developer's SOF claims are supported by an analysis that is correct (i.e whether such functions meet or exceed the claim).
Vulnerability analysis (AVA VLA)
Vulnerability analysis consists of the identification of flaws potentially introduced in the different refinement steps of the development. It results in the definition of penetration tests through the collection of the necessary information concerning: the completeness of the TSF and the dependencies between all security functions.
TOE specific attacks
Side channel analysis is a form of attack against secure tokens by which secret data is pulled out without damaging the device itself. We analyzes a threat and the side channel attacks in relation to such attacks in reference to Common Criteria, SCSUG-SCPP [6] , EUROSMARTPP [7] [8] [9] , FIPS 140-2 [10] , FIPS 140-2 DTR [11], NESSIE [12] and CRYPTREC [13] . There included power analysis attacks [14] , timing analysis attacks [15] , electromagnetic analysis [17] , fault attacks [16] and TEMPEST attacks [1] . Among them, the power analysis is more powerful than others. The summarized threats in relation to side channel analysis are shown in Table 1 . 
Experiments of power analysis attacks
The power consumption of a device, such as the smart card, is measured for a single execution of a cryptographic operation, and can be used to identify which operations are performed in what order. In public key cryptosystems, it is possible to distinguish multiplication from square, due to the difference of the differential operation of algorithm. Based on this information, the secret key can be recovered. Attackers are assumed to have various levels of expertise, resources, and motivation. Relevant expertise may be in general semiconductor technology, software engineering, hacking techniques, or in the specific TOE. It is assumed that given sufficient time and expertise, any smart card can be compromised.
Sample hardware configuration
The hardware configuration in figure 1 . demonstrates the typical DPA analysis configuration. In this configuration, a standard PC communicates with Oscilloscope and smart card reader via a standard RS-232 port. the smart card also sets the trigger for the digital oscilloscope connected to the PC. Setting or identifying the trigger allows the digital oscilloscope to take numerous samples in the area of the algorithm that is of most interest. Without the trigger, millions of samples that are irrelevant to the analysis might be collected and could complicate the data acquisition and further examination. With very small measurement samples, DPA computation is performed considerably faster. 
The MESD-DPA attacks
Now, we will carry out the MESD attacks [18] using data transition of SPA resistant exponentiation algorithm in the smart card. It is assumed that the target of attack is on the third digit {1} from the correct secret digits {1,0,1,0,...}.
Two hundred traces were analyzed at the target bit position when a device was executed by a multiplier. Since the step of multiplication and square make a difference in the power consumption, when the attacker guessed wrongly, the averaged power peaks occur at the bit period right after the wrongly guessed bit. 
The propose of the smart card security evaluation criteria for Side Channel Attacks
The propose of side channel analysis family(AVA SCA)
According to the published PPs [19] , it comments T.Covert channel, T.Fault generation, T.Interface attack in the threat, but the assurance class AVA defines only covert channel analysis(AVA CCA) in Vulnerability Assessment Family. It includes SPA/DPA, timing attack, and electromagnetic attack in vulnerabilities. However, the paper separates only differential fault analysis attack from those other parts. It have a different point of view about the side channel attacks that include not only differential fault analysis attack but also those. Accordingly, we considers if the side channel attacks are not a covert channel [20] . we will separate the part of side channel analysis from AVA CCA and AVA VLA under a discussion on CC public reviewed documents [2] [3] [4] . Therefore, this paper introduces assurance family for side channel analysis (An abbreviated AVA SCA) shown in figure 3 .
Assurance family separates side channel timing analysis family(SCA.T), side channel power analysis family(SCA.P), side channel fault analysis family(SCA.F) Fig. 3 . The proposed side channel analysis family(AVA SCA).
and side channel E-magnetic analysis family(SCA.E). We analyzes and proposes three components that are grouped on the basis of related assurance as AVA SCA.1, AVA SCA.2 and AVA SCA.3. The family contains three components that are linearly hierarchical (i.e. component 2 requires more than component 1, in terms of specific actions, specific evidence, or rigour of the actions or evidence).
We shortly mentions the assurance requirements for reformed security objectives, the evaluation assurance level and three assurance components in the Table 2 , 3, 4. 
The development of assurance component for Side Channel Attacks
Objectives The AVA SCA is carried out to determine the existence and potential capacity of unintended signalling channels (i.e. illicit information flows) that may be attacked during the operation of TOE. The assurance requirements address the threat that unintended and attackable signalling paths exist that may be exercised to violate the SFP.
Component levelling The components are levelled on increasing rigour of side channel analysis.
Application notes Channel capacity estimations are based upon informal engineering measurements, as well as actual test measurements. Examples of assumptions upon which the side channel analysis is based may include processor speed, system or network configuration, memory size, and cache size. The selective validation of the side channel analysis through testing allows the evaluator the opportunity to verify any aspect of the side channel analysis (e.g. SPA, DPA, SEMD-DPA, MESD-DPA, ZEMD-DPA, IPA, HO-DPA, TA, FA, DFA, TEMPEST). This does not impose a requirement to demonstrate the entire set of side channel analysis results. If there are no information flow control SFPs in the ST, this family of assurance requirements is no longer applicable, as this family applies only to information flow control SFPs.
AVA SCA.1 Side Channel Analysis Objectives
The objective is to identify side channels that are identifiable, through an informal search for side channels.
